Hue 1968 by Mark Bowden

Author:Mark Bowden
Language: eng, eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Grove Atlantic
Published: 2017-05-15T17:49:01+00:00

2

Something Is Wrong

Over There

PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD urged Westy to hold daily sessions with reporters while the Tet fighting continued in order to help offset the “gloom and doom.” On the first day, the general had told reporters that the real enemy target, the big battle still to come, was at Khe Sanh, and despite all evidence to the contrary, this is what he continued to insist. As for the city attacks, they were nothing more than a desperate, even suicidal act—a distraction.

Hue rarely even came up in these daily briefings. At the start, Westy acknowledged only that that “a sizeable force” had entered the city:

He [the enemy] now holds a portion of the city. ARVN forces are now in contact with the enemy attempting to clear that city of enemy units . . . In summary, gentlemen, this second phase of the [enemy’s] campaign was a bold one. It was characterized by a treachery and deceitfulness. It showed a callous disregard for human life. It has brought considerable destruction in the number of towns and cities. The enemy has paid dearly . . . How long will he be able to keep up this tempo? I give him the capability of continuing this phase of the campaign for several more days. There is, however, evidence to suggest that he is about to run out of steam.19

Over the coming weeks, Westy was frequently called upon to make sense of the fighting, particularly in Hue, where things were most definitely not ending quickly. But no matter how he looked at it, the general could not see enemy gains. He conceded nothing to Hanoi. There had been no surprise. There had been no accomplishments. No city had been lost. His adversary had tried something desperate and had failed. The losses were catastrophic. He had foreseen the move and had not just countered it; he had crushed it. Why, his prescience alone had apparently forestalled the big attack at Khe Sanh, at least for the time being. This was not an act. By all indications, the general really believed these things, even as the death toll mounted in Hue, even as world opinion collapsed around him, and even as one after another his assurances about the battle failed. Never had a general so effectively willed away the facts.

Two days into the battle the Joint Chiefs asked him to explain the meaning of the Tet Offensive and to assess the current situation. Westy again insisted that the countrywide attacks were a diversion from the big one at Khe Sanh. He had begun sending daily updates about the marine outpost directly to the president. The attack on Hue and other cities “[m]ay be a diversion to confuse friendly forces and draw our attention and possibly troops away from the major area of threat [Khe Sanh and the DMZ].” The city offensives “were not made in sufficient force to permit them to continue over a long period. For example, most of the attacks have petered out.” Westy explained that the coming offensive at Khe Sanh was still likely to happen.

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